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It has often been argued in recent years that the firm is a dynamic learning
organization. This view holds that the firm not only converts factors ofproduc-
tion into a salable product, as modeled in the neoclassical theory of the firm,
but also learns over time how better to do so. Iflearning and production indeed
occurjointly, firms preoccupied with the optimization ofproduction alone are
shortsighted and must be encouraged by either management or public policies
to invest in learning. Is there merit to considering yet another challenge to the
traditional theory of the firm? The issue, of course, is not whether the firm
learns at all. That is a question of semantics. The real issue is materiality. Do
the productive powers oflabor increase above and beyond the level predicated
on the theory ofthe firm, and is it sensible to attribute that increase, if any, to
learning on the part of the firm? The first of these two questions has been
addressed by the literature on the learning curve, albeit incompletely, and the
second ofthe two remains an open question. The gaps that exist in the story of
firm-level learning are the focal point ofthe essay that follows.
This essay, at its core, visits a factory-one ofthe twenty-two airframe fac-
tories studied by Alchian (1963) in his pioneering work of the learning-curve
literature-and, aided by the recent advance in the study of operations man-
agement, examines what happened behind an authentic learning curve inside
the black box ofthe firm. The factory is Boeing's Plant No.2 in Seattle, Wash-
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ington. This was the primary production site ofthe famous B-17 heavy bomber,
the Flying Fortress, during and prior to the Second World War. This particular
production program offers many advantages for a study ofthis nature. Being a
wartime program, it ran for an exceptionally short span oftime. The program
data therefore escaped external interference such as generic technological
progress in the society at large. The B-17 program, moreover, is relatively well
documented. The B-17 was virtually Boeing's sole product when it was in pro-
duction, and its sole customer was the government, which had to justify the
cost ofheavy bombers vis-a-vis Congress. One would be hard-pressed to find
a more attractive case to study when the central theme is firm-level learning.
4.2 The History and the Problems ofthe Learning Curve
The notion oflearning formally entered economics with the discovery ofthe
learning curve. Curiously, however, the learning curve itselfwas born when the
engineering discipline tried to rewrite the theory of the firm in earnest. T. P.
Wright, the director ofengineering ofthe Curtiss-Wright Corporation, was ap-
parently inspired by the mass production of automobiles as well as the dream
offamily airplanes when he began to plotout "theeffectofquantity production
on cost" (Wright 1936). The resulting graphs, reported in the Journal ofAero-
nautical Sciences, showed a decreasing convex curve with cost-orits compo-
nents-on the vertical axis and the sequence number of the airplane on the
horizontal axis. When converted to logarithmic scale, the graphs looked linear,
suggesting not only predictability but also specific mathematical relationship:
labor required per unit-or, interpreted more casually, unit cost-is a nega-
tively sloping log-linear function ofthe cumulative volume ofproduction. It is
this mathematical formulation that was later named variously the learning
curve, experience curve, and progress function. All three refer to the same phe-
nomenon while emphasizing a slightly different aspect: the process, cause, and
outcome of the cost behavior, respectively. In the studies that followed, the
formulation fit data quite well in a wide range ofindustries including, but not
limited to, shipbuilding, machine tools, specialty chemicals, and semicon-
ductors.
The learning curve thus established empirically resembles the average-cost
function of the traditional theory of the firm in that both strip the firm all the
way down to two variables and formalize a widely held beliefamong industri-
alists: the unit cost goes down as a firm or a factory makes more ofthe same
product. The learning curve, however, departs from the traditional theory of
the firm in two respects. First, it replaces the variable on the horizontal axis.
In lieu ofthe rate ofoutput (output perperiod), to which economists are accus-
tomed, it inserts cumulative output. Interestingly, though, Wright himself was
quite possibly indifferent to the choice between the two variables. He was con-
cerned with the cost estimate of the Nth airplane in production and always
labeled the horizontal axis of the graphs N-the sequence number ofthe air-147 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
plane-and not as cumulative output. Moreover, he perhaps had no choice but
to use the sequence number, as opposed to the rate of output. Given the long
time needed to build each unit of an airplane and the small number of units
demanded by the market for an airplane, it was not very practical to gauge the
rate of output for any natural unit of time, such as week, month, and ;year,
unless a reliable method to measure a fraction of an airplane was devised. In
Wright's data, N fell short of 150 in one case and 40 in the other despite years
ofdata gathering. Second, the learning curve departs from the traditional the-
ory ofthe firm in its adoption ofa specific functional form. Although the log-
linear formulation was justified only by computational convenience and subse-
quent good fit, it enabled the learning curve to spell out the cost ofevery unit
in the production sequence and the associated factor requirements once its two
parameters-the initial cost and the rate oflearning-are estimated.
The two points ofdeparture-the use ofcumulative output on the horizontal
axis and the specification of the functional form-are thus arbitrary in terms
ofhow they came into being. But it is precisely these two features that led to
the widespread appeal of the learning-curve formulation. For one, they to-
gether eliminate uncertainty as well as dependence upon decisions, such as
setting the rate ofoutput, from the estimation ofthe unit cost and factor usage,
thus opening an avenue to a new possibility of planning operations (Andress
1954) or formulating strategy (Boston Consulting Group 1972) around these
deterministic estimates. Those who wish that the pragmatism of engineering
ruled management are finally vindicated. For another, cumulative output
makes sense as a proxy variable for some sort ofproduction-related experience
and, therefore, permits plausible interpretations of the learning curve. In one
such interpretation, the learning-by-doing hypothesis, cumulative output is
thought to measure the amount ofon-the-job practice performed by the direct
workers and, consequently, the level of skills they bring to bear on the work
they do (Hirschmann 1964). Alternatively, one may think ofcumulative output
as growing in proportion to the feedback engineers receive from the shop floor
regarding the robustness ofthe process or the manufacturability ofthe product
they developed (Hirsch 1952; Conway and Schultz 1959). Then, the learning
curve represents the level ofengineering refinement and, in tum, the ease with
which direct workers ofa given skill level perform their task. Be itdirect work-
ers' engineers, or both who actually learn in the firm, those who hold that
experience is the mother of improvement are vindicated by these interpreta-
tions ofthe learning curve.
1
The learning curve is interesting because it seemingly captures a force that
1. If cumulative output merely represents experience, there may well be other proxy variables
that are equally good. The one that has been studied most on this line ofreasoning is the elapsed
time (Fellner 1969). This alternative model makes sense ifthe stimulus oflearning is independent
ofproduction and bound by the passage oftime. As opposed to learning by doing, one may call it
a model of learning by thinking. The same contrast is often framed as induced learning versus
autonomous learning (Levy 1965; Yelle 1979; Dutton and Thomas 1984).148 Kazuhiro Mi~hina
is not present in the traditional theory ofthe firm. However, a question is inevi-
table. Does it truly mark a departure from economies ofscale-acentral force
shaping the average-cost function in the theory ofthe firm? Is it not merely the
division of labor in disguise? Despite the seriousness of the question, the
learning-curve literature offers no clear-cut answers.
The problem is twofold. First, when Wright discovered the learning curve,
he was in fact walking familiar territory covered well by Adam Smith. He
wrote, "The factors which make possible cost reductions with increase in the
quantity produced are as follows: the improvement in proficiency of a work-
man ... less changes to disconcertthe workman ... greater spread ofmachine
and fixture set up time . . . ability to use less skilled labor as more and more
tooling and standardization of procedure is introduced" (Wright 1936, 124).
One may contrast this quote with an earlier well-known observation. Adam
Smith, in his inquiry into the causes ofthe wealth ofnations, opened his text
with an account ofcontemporary pin manufacturing practice, in which an ordi-
nary factory employed ten workers to staffapproximately eighteen distinct op-
erations and produced upwards of48,000 pins a day. This amounted to 4,800
pins per worker per day although, he wrote, the workers were not capable of
making 20 pins each a day alone. Smith reasoned that the dramatic improve-
ment in the productive powers oflabor was due, directly, toa proper division
and combination ofthe different operations and, indirectly, toa large scale of
operations--and a large market size-which permitted the division of labor
in the first place. He thus established scale-usuallymeasured bythe flow rate
ofoutput, such as 20 pins a day or 48,000 pins a day-as the most important
variable in the costfunction or,morebroadly, in the theory ofthe firm. Interest-
ingly, Smith ([1776] 1976, 11) attributed the effect ofthe division of labor to
three factors: "first to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman;
secondly, to the saving ofthe time which is commonly lost in passing from one
species of work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of
machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the
work of many." These three points correspond almost perfectly to Wright's
passage explaining the reasons for the declining costofairplanes.
Second, the learning curve andthe economies ofscale are virtually indistin-
guishable in the majority ofeconometric studies. The reason is thecollinearity
between their right-hand-side variables, that is, cumulative output and the rate
ofoutput, since the former is nothing but the latter summed ove~ time. Collin-
earity is especially strong where the rate ofoutput follows an upward trend, as
cumulative output always does by definition, and the unit cost or labor hours a
downward trend: a pattern predominant in the data used in the learning-curve
studies. Thus, it is generally difficult, ifnot impossible, to properly decompose
whatever variations there are in the unit cost data into the part explained by the
rate ofoutput, that is, the effect ofscale, and the part explainedby cumulative
output, that is, the effect of learning, so long as the effort to do so relies ex-149 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
elusively on numerical data analysis. Herein lies the promise ofdetailed case
studies.
4.3 The B-17 Program
The Boeing B-17 heavy bomber, known otherwise as the Flying Fortress,
was the first four-engined, all-metal, midwing monoplane.2 It served the U.S.
Army Air Forces as a workhorse during World War II. It received much atten...
tion, both during and after the war, in part because it was one ofthe few experi-
mental bomber designs that were deemed combat-worthy when the war broke
out in Europe and President Franklin D. Roosevelt suddenly called for 50,000
airplanes a year. The B-17 production program, and in particular its efficiency
and ramp-up speed, thus took on a special meaning as a crucial test of the
nation's combatreadiness. It was in this context thattheAir Materiel Command
(1946a) later studied this program extensively as an integral part ofits postwar
planning efforts and issued a comprehensive report on the program perfor-
mance. This case-study report is the primary source of information for the
analysis that follows. The report was compiled on the basis ofextensive inter-
views ofBoeing personnel,
3 and the Boeing Aircraft Company concurred that
"[a]ll corrections and revisions recommended by us were embodied in this
report except those concerning the section on Management"-a section of
little interest for the purpose ofthis essay. The report is generally approving of
the choices made by the company during the war, and concludes that the B-17
program's rate ofacceleration "compares favorably with that reached by other
manufacturers ofheavy bombers throughout the country" (ix).
The B-17 began its life in July 1935 as the Model 299-Boeing's answer
to an army air corps circular calling for a new multiengined bomber. Boeing
developed a semimonocoque all-metal bomber with four engines, by far the
largest and boldest entry in the competition.4 Boeing, however, was disquali-
fied because the only Model 299 it built crashed and burned during the first
official test flight. The contract was awarded to a sister model of the Douglas
DC-3: a two-engined airplane that was to set the standard for commercial avia-
tion. Boeing's risk-taking was nonetheless rewarded with a small contract for
2. A monoplane has only one pair of wings. A biplane has two pairs of wings, one above and
one below the fuselage.
3. The report acknowledges the help it received from Boeing's key officers. Theirtitles are listed
as Engineering Historian, Tooling General Superintendent, Liaison Engineer, General Supervisor
Training, Assistant to Operations Manager, Assistant to Executive Vice President, Director ofIn-
dustrial Relations, Assistant to ChiefProject Engineer, Assistant to ChiefCostAccountant, Mate-
rial Manager, Plant Facilities Manager, Personnel Manager, BDV Committee Member, Assistant
to the President, Chief Cost Accountant, Operations Manager, Business Office Superintendent,
Analyst & Statistician, Quality Manager, Assistant to Production Manager, Superintendent Man-
power, ChiefEngineer, and Executive Vice President.
4. An airplane with a monocoque structure lets the skin absorb all the stresses to which it is sub-
jected.150 Kazuhiro Mishina
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Fig.4.1 The variations ofthe B-17
thirteen test units. The YB-17 thus came to life with a new and improved en-
gine, and the B-17 series, despite the criticism in Congress that this heavy
bomber was too large and too expensive, eventually evolved through nine of-
ficial designations (fig. 4.1).5 Ofthe nine designations, the last three, E, F, and
G, were produced in large numbers and flown over combat theaters. The other
designations up to D were more ofa prototype, pushing the limit ofthe basic
design. The cruising speed and altitude ofthe B-17 increased constantly from
the Model 299 to the D designation, and thereafter remained unchanged. Be-
tween D and E, the rear fuselage was enlarged to accommodate more gunners
and heavier defensive armament. Once the basic design was frozen with the B-
17E, the subsequent designations differed from E predominantly in terms of
added-on armament.6 Indeed, Boeing internally categorized E, F, and G as
"Model 2990" as if they were identical, and so did the Royal Air Force as
"Fortress II." In the remainder ofthe essay, these three designations are collec-
tively identified as the production version of the B-17. Boeing built a grand
total of6,981 units of the B-17, of which 6,847 units were, according to this
definition, the production version.
Boeing built almost all B-17s in its main plant (PlantNo.2)in Seattle, which
started its life in 1935. Plant No. 2's achievement in both ramp-up speed and
productivity is impressive by any standards. Being one ofa few proven bomb-
ers at the outbreak of the war, the B-17 was called upon as an implement of
strategic bombing. The War Department issued a letter ofintent ordering 512
5. For the history of the heavy bomber program, see Craven and Cate (1955), Holley (1964),
and Rae (1968).
6. Davis (1984), for example, explains the evolution ofthe airplane in more detail.151 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
B-17Es in July 1940, and thereby made Boeing begin its planning for plant,
tooling, and workforce expansion. The delivery of the production version be-
gan with five units in September 1941. Monthly production then rose steadily,
reaching 100 units in the course of July 1942 and 200 units in the course of
May 1943. Plant No.2 recorded peakproduction in March 1944 when it deliv-
ered a staggering total of362 units. In the next month, Boeing continued pro-
duction but also began the conversion of Plant No.2 from the B-17 to the
newer and larger B-29. The effort accelerated in February 1945, but the war
ended before the B-29 saw mass production.? Plant No.2 delivered its last 32
B-17Gs in April 1945.
The B-17 was a complex airplane to build, requiring tolerances as tight as
0.005 inches and more than six miles ofwiring. The five airplanes delivered in
September 1941 consumedon average 142,837 direct laborhours perairframe:
the equivalent ofapproximately 71 worker-years.8 Thereafter, unit direct labor
hours followed a declining trend. They bottomed out in August 1944 at 15,316
hours, almost one-tenth ofwhat had been needed 35 months earlier. Productiv-
ity suffered during the cutback phase, and the 100 airplanes delivered in De-
cember 1944 embodied 21,357 direct labor hours per airframe. Nevertheless,
it is incontrovertible that Plant No.2 exhibited a dramatic learning effect as
measured by the direct labor hours needed for each airframe. The government
accordingly reduced the price it paid to Boeing from $242,200 for the first B-
17E to $144,824 for the last B-17G despite the vast improvement made to the
airplane in between.9 Figure 4.2 shows a plot ofmonthly output and unit direct
labor hours.
With the information in figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is possible to draw a classical
learning curve for the B-17 program. The relevant data here cover the 40-
month period between September 1941 and December 1944.
10 The dependent
variable of interest is the unit direct labor hours, it' which is shown on the
vertical axis offigure 4.2. This variable measures the work hours logged by the
direct workers of Boeing and its subcontractors, averaged over all airframes
that were delivered to the government in month t.
ll One may argue that the unit
cost is superior to it as dependent variable, but it is a major driver of the unit
production cost of the airframe. 12 Moreover, where production is labor inten-
sive, it makes a cleaner measure ofthe true unit cost than the accounting cost,
7. See Hershey (1944) and Boeing's 1945 annual report.
8. An airframe here refers to an airplane less such government-furnished items as engines and
armament.
9. Note that the total cost of an airplane is dominated by the material cost, and explained only
partly by the labor cost.
10. The delivery of the B-17G continued through the first four months of 1945, but data re-
porting did not.
11. See Asher (1956), Reguero (1957), and Alchian (1963) for a comprehensive account ofthe
original source and the definition ofthe data.
12. Reguero (1957), for example, estimated that wages represented 60 percent ofthe unit cost

































which rather arbitrarily allocates overhead expenses and fixed costs (Wright
1936).
The classical learning curve is written as
(1) log it = a + b log 1;,
or it = aY~, where Ytstands for the cumulative output, or Yt= L~=l Xs' where
Xs in turn stands for the output in month s. Applying this formulation to the B-
17 data, column 1oftable 4.1 reports the result ofthe popularregression using
ordinary least squares (OLS). It indicates that the best estimate ofb is - .472,
that is, every doubling ofcumulative output gives rise to 27.9 percent decline
in the unit direct labor hours. The coefficient ofdetermination adjusted for the
degree of freedom, R2, is respectably high and the estimate ofparameter b is
statistically different from zero. This is where analysis usually ends and specu-
lation begins concerning the implications ofthe learning curve to policymak-
ers, business executives, and operations managers.
The problem is that such an estimate of the learning curve is not unbiased153 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
Table 4.1 Linear Regression oflog IT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 6.001 6.263 6.534 6.632 4.629 6.741 6.621
logkT -.58P - .488a -.567a -.735a -.902a -.547a
(.083) (.109) (.089) (.079) (.210) (.093)
logXT -.493a -.37P -.285a -.266a -.780a -.292a
(.029) (.046) (.043) (.050) (.057) (.044)
T -.010a
(.001)
logY, -.472a -.29P -.052
(.023) (.026) (.065)
logZT -.530a -.524a -.444a
(.039) (.043) (.113)
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS EGLS OLS OLS
Degrees offreedom 38 36 36 36 35 37 35
R2 .917 .981 .969 .978 .961 .868 .978
Durbin-Watson 1.113b 0.908b 0.847b 1.303c 1.485d 0.067b 1.263c
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
aCoefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1percent confidence level.
bThe Durbin-Watson statistic does not exceed the lower bound at the 1 percent confidence level.
cThe Durbin-Watson statistic exceeds the lower bound but not the upper bound at the 1 percent confi-
dencelevel.
dThe Durbin-Watson statistic exceeds the upper bound at the 1 percent confidence level.
despite the strong indications ofeconomic and statistical significance. The re-
sult reported in column 1 of table 4.1 reproduces the common problem: the
Durbin-Watson statistic is too small to support the null hypothesis ofno auto-
correlation at the 1 percent confidence level. That is to say, the OLS estimator
that led to the fitted learning curve is most likely biased, the meaning ofwhich
is that the classical formulation ofthe learning curve (1) may well be misspeci-
fied. Figure 4.3 plots the residuals from the regression ofcolumn 1 and makes
the issue obvious. The pattern that emerges is clearly far from random. Even
if the dip at the beginning is explained away by the changeover from the E
designation to the F designation, the systematic deviation occurring throughout
1944 suggests that variables are missing from the regression. This is the prob-
lern Alchian (1963) encountered when he found that the learning curve was
not able to predict labor hours reliably. The learning curve tells us an interest-
ing story. But as an explanation of quantitative facts it stands on remarkably
shaky ground.
4.4 Inside Plant No.2
It is one thing to find a flaw in the classic learning-curve formulation, but it
is quite another to find an alternative explanation for the dramatic decrease in
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Fig. 4.3 The residuals
able. First, what happened is simply an example of scale economies. On the
shop floor, in this interpretation, labor would have been divided more and more
as production expanded from 5 airframes a month to 362 airframes a month.
A second hypothesis might be that the learning-curve story was not tested
properly by the calculations in column 1 of table 4.1 and in figure 4.3. The
classic learning curve would be well specified if all the sources of Boeing's
production experience were considered. A third possibility is that the quality
of the airframes that were produced deteriorated over time or that the B-1?
became, because of small design changes, a simpler product to build. This
hypothesis amounts not to a claim that efficiency improved but rather to the
claim that, as time passed, there was less work involved in building the B-1?
airframes. Yet another possibility is that labor input might have improved. On
this reading, the learning-by-doing hypothesis is still valid in fact, even though
measurement is difficult. One more possibility, of course, is "none of the
above." Something other than the division of labor was at work, but it is not
quite learning by doing on the shop floor either. The text that follows scruti-155 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
nizes these hypotheses based on the historical records ofthe B-17 production
program.
4.4.1 Scale Economies
There is no denying that the decrease in the unit direct labor hours in the B-
17 program was dramatic. But, then, so was the increase in output. Is itpossible
that the learning curve is yet another expression of the consequences of the
transition from small- to large-scale operations? Answering this question re-
quires a careful examination ofthe production processes as well as the changes
made to them over time.
Boeing builtthe B-17 in the main building ofPlantNo. 2. 13 This huge square
structure on a 66-acre site covered 37 acres under one roof and boasted a total
floor space of42 acres with balconies. The building was erected with utmost
flexibility in mind.
14 Overhead cranes and underground utility tunnels permit-
ted just about any layout configuration. In practice, work in progress moved
from the west end ofthe building, where machine shops were located, toward
final assembly on the east endjustoffthe airfield. Between the two production
areas was the enormous expanse ofthe subassembly area.
The subassembly area was divided into many rectangular sections ofvarious
sizes. These sections were bordered by a clear boundary because each was
filled tightly with only one kind of airframe segment-inboard wing, for ex-
ample-and adjacent sections were filled with completely different airframe
segments. Figure 4.4 shows the inboard wing section (front) as well as the
forward fuselage section (back). Between are several completed fuselages
heading for final assembly. Figure 4.5 is a close-up view ofthe forward fuse-
lage section. The production areas, proceeding from parts fabrication to subas-
sembly to final assembly, were sandwiched by the storage areas that occupied
the entire north and south sides of the building. The storage areas received
shipments from subcontractors and suppliers, and in turn fed the production
areas with the parts and materials they needed.
Boeing's production method featured a combination ofstationary subassem-
bly and short multiline final assembly. The idea was to minimize the time work
in progress spent in the final assembly stage, because once the fuselage and
the wings were joined, the airframe wasted space on the shop floor and unnec-
essarily increased the time workers spent walking backand forth. Thus, Boeing
chose to break down the B-17's airframe production into roughly fifty sub-
assemblies upon the arrival of the E designation. These subassemblies were
neatly jammed into sections of their own in the subassembly area and com-
pleted there as independent units by moving crews while stationary in a hold-
ing jig. When a subassembly piece was ready to move on, it was picked up by
13. Aviation (July 1943) describes this building and the production method adopted therein.
14. When Plant No.2 was erected, the company faced profound uncertainties with regard to the
product mix and production volume both during and after the war.Fig.4.4 B-17Es in Plant No.2: inboard wing subassembly
Source: USAF Museum (Wright-Patterson AF Base).
Fig.4.5 B-17Es in Plant No.2: forward fuselage subassembly
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an overhead crane and carried all the way to another section that would bolt it
together with a few other subassemblies to form a major assembly segment-
for example, the inboard wing segment comprising the body ofthe wing, flaps,
engine nacelles, and deicers. 15 Major assemblies likewise joined one another
on one of several final assembly lines, where the remaining work, such as at-
taching propellers, was divi€led among a few stations. Gigantic airplanes stood
immediately one after another in this area, and moved every now and then on
their own set of wheels for the first time. Figure 4.6 shows a final assembly
line in Plant No.2 (another is seen starting on the right-hand edge).
The huge plant building as well as the production method described above
did not emerge overnight. Understanding the precise timing will prove to be
important.16 When Boeing started building the first B-17 (Model 299), it had
only one manufacturing facility (Plant No.1). In this plant, skilled workers
fabricated parts with drop hammers, put together major segments of the air-
plane on wooden jigs, and installed assorted equipment on the airplane as it sat
immobile in the center of the assembly building.17 In 1935, in expectation of
the coming ofgigantic metal airplanes such as the B-17, Boeing acquired the
land for Plant No.2 one mile away from its original site. Thereafter, Plant
No. 2's main building expanded through four projects. The first two of them,
amounting to 9 percent ofthe floor space ofthe eventual main building, were
carried out in 1936 and 1937. Figure 4.7 shows the very first B-17 (Model 299)
being assembled in Plant No.1 in 1935, and figure 4.8 shows B-17Bs being
assembled in the brand-new Plant No.2 in 1939.
With the coming ofthe B-17E, both the scale and the method ofproduction
changed significantly. The third expansion project commenced in May 1940,
immediately following the French order for the DB-7 and President Roose-
velt's call for 50,000 airplanes a year. The project added 38 percent ofthe floor
space ofthe eventual main building, and occupancy began six months after the
start of construction. In August 1940 Boeing established the Tooling Depart-
ment for the first time, because approximately 75 percent of the tools were
rendered obsolete by the design changes introduced to the B-17E. This group,
staffed fully in one year, added hydraulic presses, steel jigs, and special alter-
ations ofgeneral-purpose drilling and milling machines. In October 1940 Boe-
ing obtained government financing and initiated the fourth expansion project.
This last phase completed the remaining 53 percent of the main building to
increase capacity from ten to sixty B-17s per month. In June 1941 another
government-financing contract permitted Boeing to order additional machine
15. Beall (1945) offers an account of the design detail by the vice president of engineering at
the time. Bowers (1976) contains the history ofthe airplane as well as a story told by its original
designer.
16. The evolution of Plant No. 2 is reported in great detail in several issues ofAero Digest,
including February 1937, January 1938, February 1938, November 1940, and October 1941.
17. Laudan (1936) offers an account by a factory superintendent as to how Boeing built the
prototype model 299. See also Klemin (1940) and Bowers (1976) for informative photographs of
Plant No.2 when it was building the B-17B.Fig.4.6 B-17Es in Plant No.2: final assembly
Source: USAF Museum (Wright-Patterson AF Base).
Fig.4.7 Model 299 in Plant No.1
Source: Bowers (1976), 44.159 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
Fig.4.8 B-17Bs in Plant No.2
Source: Bowers (1976), 44.
tools and increase monthly capacity to seventy-five B-17s. Throughout these
expansion projects, Boeing chose to extend its production philosophy that val-
ued flexibility rather than reconfiguring the plant layout.
From available evidence, it seems that Boeing's resources for mass produc-
tion were largely in place by the end of the B-17E run, that is, by May 1942
when the first B-17F was delivered. All told, Boeing added $17.4 million of
fixed assets to its balance sheet from 1940 to 1945 for the war effort at Plant
No.2. Of these, 69 percent were in place by the end of 1941 and 96 percent
by the following year. The Tooling Department had completed most of the
required 70,000 dies and jigs in time for the beginning ofthe mass production
ofthe B-17E. This included the oft-cited special-purpose equipment that Boe-
ing credited for the productivity improvement. Major additions after May 1942
consisted of the expansion of warehouse space in the summer of 1942, the
leasing ofsix feeder plants that increased plant space by 10 percent in the fall
of 1943, and the construction of a cafeteria, an office building, and a wind160 Kazuhiro Mishina
tunnel in 1943. During the production phase of the B-17F and B-17G, there
was no investment in productive capacity.
Whatdoes this all mean?The B-17's production version maintained a down-
ward trend ofthe unit direct labor hours with neither notable capacity expan-
sions nor changes in the production method. In fact, Boeing took the facility,
equipment, and method that were designed to tum out 75 airframes a month,
and built as many as 362 airframes at the peak ofits monthly production. One
may well argue, turning the logic of scale economies upside down, that large
scale, as measured by the rate of output, is the result, and not the cause, of
improved efficiency. Scale, as measured by the size of productive capacity,
remained nearly constant, and is likewise unable to explain changes in the unit
direct labor hours over a period as long as three years. I8
What if scale is measured by the batch size? As figure 4.9 shows, the batch
size shrank at the beginning with the introduction ofthe block production sys-
tem, which was devised to cope with a flock ofdesign changes on the basis of
a relatively small standard batch size. The batch size then jumped from 100
airframes to 200 airframes with a period of struggling transition in between.
In contrast to this stepwise movement of the batch size, the unit direct labor
hours declined smoothly throughout much of these periods. Granted that the
changes are by and large in the same direction, the patterns ofchange are too
different to suggest that the batch size is the direct cause of improved effi-
ciency. The reverse causal link-improved efficiency permitted the batch size
to expand-seems, if anything, more plausible. To sum, no matter how scale
is measured, scale economies cannot provide an adequate explanation for the
dramatic efficiency improvement in the B-17 program.I9
4.4.2 External Experience
The missing variable in the classic learning curve may well be experience
external to the B-17 program. That is, the dramatic efficiency improvement is
a learning effect after all. It is justthat Boeing learned from sources other than
its own experience ofbuilding B-17s. Does this line ofreasoning hold water?
It appears that the answer is no. The Air Materiel Command (1946a, 6) re-
marks that "Boeing had had very little, if any, production experience prior to
the B-17 program. They had produced airplanes, but never in quantity. The B-
17 was their first real production program." In its quarter-century history prior
to the war, Boeing built only some 2,100 airplanes, most ofwhich had neither
the metal construction nor the size ofthe B-17 (see Aero Digest July 1941). In
contrast, it built more than three times as many B-17s: a grand total of 6,981
units. Boeing did assemble 240 Douglas-designed,DB-7Bs for the French gov-
18. To be precise, productive capacity here refers to a concept of scale proposed by Alchian
(1959): the contemplated volume ofproduction. In the case ofthe B-17 at Plant No.2, it remained
basically constant at 75 airframes a month.
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Fig. 4.9 The effect ofbatch size
ernment in 1940 at Plant No.2, but even this experience pales in comparison
with the B-17 program.
Not only did Boeing produce B-17s without any relevant previous experi-
ence, Plant No.2 also did so without any relevant parallel experience. Boeing
did develop another heavy bomber, the B-29, to replace the aging B-17 toward
the end ofthe war, but Plant No.2 actually built only three prototypes ofthat
airplane. Mass production ofthe B-29 took place at Renton, Washington, and
Wichita, Kansas, in the government-owned facilities, to which Plant No.2
transferred a nucleus ofpersonnel with a stackofengineering documents. Sim-
ilarly, when Douglas and Vega joined Boeing in the production of the B-17F
and B-17G in response to the solicitation from the government, and under li-
cense from Boeing, PlantNo.2 assisted these newcomers, and not vice versa.20
20. Chapter 20 ofHolley (1964) describes the joint production effort, known as the BDV com-
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Plant No.2 was always a mother plant rather than a recipient of know-how
from external sources. IfBoeing did learn from experience, the source ofthat
experience must be found inside Plant No.2 and with regard to the B-17.
4.4.3 Product Alteration
The B-17 built in 1944 might not have been the same B-17 built in 1941. If
newer B-17s required less labor by design, the decrease in the unit direct labor
hours observed in the B-17 program is not as dramatic as it first appears. Were
there changes in the B-17 in ways that accommodate this line ofargument?
The B-17 did undergo numerous engineering changes: 155 of them with
the B-17E, 760 with the B-17F, and 634 with the B-17G. Few, however, were
introduced to improve manufacturability or otherwise address concerns and
suggestions from the shop floor. Boeing's engineering department was in fact
overwhelmed by the requests from the battlefield that kept uncovering the B-
17's weaknesses in every detail.21 The most important feature ofthese changes
was that the B-17 acquired more and more armament from batch to batch, and
became, ifanything, a more complex product to assemble. By the same token,
the B-17's quality was always subjected to the toughest of any field tests one
can imagine. Nevertheless, quality problems were never cited by any sources I
have been able to uncover. On the contrary, the B-17 acquired a reputation of
being the most rugged and well built ofany heavy bomber as more and more
crews returned alive from bombing missions in planes that were severely dam-
aged by fierce enemy counterattacks (see Bowers 1976, chap. 9). To guarantee
that this would be the case, the Army Air Forces accepted B-17s only after
rigorous inspection by on-site representatives. It is inconceivable that the dra-
matic decline in the unit direct labor hours was caused by equally dramatic
deterioration in the quality of the output, or by improvement in manufactura-
bility.
4.4.4 Learning by Doing
Cumulative output is a proxy variable. It may have failed to represent the
rising skill level of direct workers, but it is still possible that the behavior of
the unit direct labor hours is explained by improvement in dexterity. Or is it?
Here is what happened with the workforce at Plant No.2. Boeing initiated
all-out hiring efforts in August 1941 as the first B-17Es neared final assembly.
In just six months the number of direct workers increased from 9,972 to
21,083. However, this was the peak as far as the head count goes. After Febru-
ary 1942, turnover either outpaced or matched hiring, and the number ofdirect
workers consequently fluctuated around 17,000 f.or the rest of the B-17 pro-
gram. In fact, the chronic labor shortage was so severe that Boeing set up
21. The working-paper version of this paper (Mishina 1992, 19-21) offers additional data and
formal analysis on the subject of engineering's contribution to efficiency improvement. The con-
clusion drawn is that the pattern of unit direct labor hours has little correlation with the hours
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feeder plants in the summer of 1943 to tap into labor supplies outside the im-
mediate Seattle area. Boeing also tried to make the best use ofsubcontractors
starting with the B-17C, to mitigate the labor shortage. It did not take long to
exhaust this source, however: the subcontracting ratio already reached 28 per-
cent with the B-17E and never exceeded 33 percent thereafter. Just like the
case ofthe fixed assets, the size ofthe workforce already approached its peak
figure with the E designation.
Unlike the plant and equipment, the workforce underwent significant quali-
tative changes during the mass-production phase and its skill deteriorated con-
siderably. The early variants ofthe B-17 were built by a group ofskilled crafts-
men who had learned the ins and outs ofairframe production through trial and
error. With the outbreak ofthe war, these men eitherenlisted or were promoted
to supervisory positions, and Boeing had to tap into entirely new labor pools
to staff Plant No.2. "During 1941," the Air Materiel Command (1946a, 65)
summarizes, "it could fairly be said that hiring specifications were strict, [but]
as labor became scarcer the contractor was forced to adopt lower standards and
take whatever labor was available." Given this reality, it is difficult to accept an
argument that the quality ofdirect labor may have increased over time.
Moreover, whatever labor Boeing was able to employ did not stay with the
company long enough to acquire new craft skills. For example, Boeing started
hiring female workers for the first time in its history to cope with the chronic
labor shortage.
22 Female employment, which was less than 1,000 in 1941, in-
creased steadily and reached 16,000 by early 1944. In other words, Plant No.
2 attained its peak production as well as peak efficiency predominantly with
green hands and not with the men who were brought into the plant by the
massive hiring program of 1941. The heroic female workers-known gener-
ally as Rosie the Riveter-had had a factory job only for a year or two when
Plant No.2 recorded its best performance.
23 Unless labor skill is easily trans-
ferable, these facts undermine the leaming-by-doing hypothesis that regards
direct workers as the principal embodiment ofexperiential learning.24
4.4.5 Production System
It is clear by now that learning, in this case, went far beyond factor inputs.
Simply stated, output and productivity did not peak until 1944 whereas the
buildup ofcapital and laborleveled offby early 1942. There is also no apparent
22. See Froelich (1942) for general labor conditions ofthe industry.
23. The turnover rate was high throughout the B-17 program due partly to wage competition
from the shipyards in the immediate vicinity. Absenteeism ranged from 7.2 percent (September)
to 10.8 percent (December) in 1943, and from 5.5 percent (January) to 8.6 percent (October)
in 1944.
24. The point is not to deny workers' ability to learn. Boeing's 1944 annual report credited
workers, for example, by stating that in 1944 the Employee Suggestion System collected 12,493
entries, 2,380 (19 percent of which were awarded and put in use. The point is that Plant No.2
exhibited a steady learning effect even when the faces ofdirect workers were constantly changing.
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indication of positive qualitative changes in capital and labor that were em-
ployed for the B-17F and B-17G. It is clear instead that learning at Plant No.
2 stretched its effective capacity well beyond the original plan-more than
quadrupling, to be precise.
The only way in which this could have happened is through a rising velocity
of work in progress that moved through the limited space of the main plant
building. This point warrants elaboration, for it highlights the importance of
the production system as distinct from factor inputs ofproduction. Space limi-
tation imposes an upper bound on the amount ofwork in progress (WIP) that
can be stored on the shop floor. If system cycle time (SCT) is defined as the
elapsed time between two successive units ofoutput exiting the plant building,
and throughput time (TPT) as the interval between the entry to and the exit
from the plant building of a specific unit ofoutput, the following relationship
must hold true for a given unit oftime.25
(2) WIP ~ WIP = TPT = TPT x (OUTPUT).
SCT
When monthly output increases, throughput time as measured in months must
decrease accordingly once the plant exhausts all the floor space it can use. This
is the precise meaning ofthe rising velocity. In Plant No.2 the level ofwork-
in-progress inventory actually declined steeply throughout 1943, and the
weighted average throughput time dropped from 1.48 months in the last five
months of 1942, down to 0.88 months in 1943, and further to 0.48 months
in 1944.
The few accounts put forward in 1943 by the witnesses ofwartime produc-
tion suggest the linkage between the rising velocity and changes in the produc-
tion system. One of them comes from the superintendent of tooling at Plant
No.2 (Bucey 1943). This manager assigned much of the credit for declining
unit direct labor hours to the extensive tooling program, which explicitly fo-
cused on speedierproduction. Interestingly, the point he made was not so much
about the time savings in machining: more important was the reduction ofre-
work at assembly thanks to greater interchangeability of parts. Assembly in
fact consumed about 80 percent of all direct labor hours, a substantial part of
which dealt with rework.26 Decrease in the amount ofrework would certainly
help airplanes to leave the plant building more rapidly and free up floor space
for more units ofwork in progress at the same time.
A critical point here is the cause of greater interchangeability. There is no
25. WIP in equation (2) measures the number of airplanes in various stages of production,
counting all ofthem equally.
26. Boeing's 1939 annual report blamed rework for losses it incurred on the B-17B. According
to Bucey (1943, 221), "Incorrectly manufactured parts can result in abnormally high assembly
costs which are difficult to segregate. Ifa part doesn't fit, the amount ofrework on the job which
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denying that the kind ofequipment that arrived with the B-17E made a differ-
ence vis-a-vis the old days oflow-volume production. Yet much had to do with
procedures and simple devices. Bucey (1943) vividly illustrated an example in
which a worker used a hand tool on his own discretion to keep production
on schedule when regular equipment broke down, and consequently created
tolerance problems downstream. Human errors and mistakes like this hurt in-
terchangeability, despite good intentions, where there was, for example, no
clear documentation specifying how abnormal situations should be handled
under various circumstances. Plant No.2 reduced these opportunities for hu-
man errors with production illustrations, templates, and revisions of tooling
development procedures.27 These initiatives were all an integral part ofthe pro-
duction system.
Another account comes from executives of different heavy-bomber pro-
ducers (Laddon 1943; Perelle 1943). They found that more than 70 percent
of their throughput time went into handling and, due to backtracking, some
parts traveled more than a mile between two stations that were only fifty feet
apart. They concluded that the shop floor's crowded condition caused waste-
fulness, confusion, and inefficiency with increase in orders. Their solution was
to streamline the process so that the right number of fabricated parts could
reach the right place at the right time and the entire flow could be in a direct
line to the last operation. They abolished the central finished-parts stockroom
and made sure that the small stock bins carried only eight to ten days' sup-
plies. This story amounts to a prefiguration of today's just-in-time (JIT) pro-
duction.
Given Boeing's production method, which relied on overhead cranes for the
handling of work in progress, implementation of JIT production must have
been inevitable as soon as Plant No.2 exhausted slack floor space. It was sim-
ply impossible to keep a larger number of bulky pieces of work in progress,
such as forward fuselage, in transit, that is, hung in the air. Work in progress
therefore could not leave one section and move on to the next until the destina-
tion section freed up a holding jig. In other words, production had to be pulled
strictly from downstream sections. A plant tour report (Aviation July 1943,
310) thus stated: "Behind all this fluid activity is a perfect timing. Ifone divi-
sion falls behind, it is as instantly apparent as an empty space in a line." It
is not difficult to imagine the degree of coordination this plant required for
production control.
A primary cause ofthe rising velocity at Plant No.2 was the tighter imple-
mentation ofJIT production. The Air Materiel Command (1946a, 36) pointed
to one trend that persisted throughout the growth phase ofthe B-17 production
program: ''As the production schedules were increased, the degree of break-
27. Wright (1939) also emphasized similar managerial initiatives and cited Boeing for its use
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down [into subassemblies] was ofnecessity proportionately increased." In es-
sence, Plant No.2 divided the subassembly area into an ever larger number of
smaller sections. As a result, the direct workers could work on a larger number
ofairframesegmentsofagiven airplaneatany givenmomentinthefactory with-
outinterfering with one another. The change thus increased the intensity with
which an airplane was assembled and, therefore, the velocity ofproduction.
This gain did not come easily. More breakdown into finer subassemblies
also meant less slack in each subassembly section and so less leeway for the
smooth operations ofthe entire plant. Behind the rising velocity, the plant was
increasingly vulnerable to any deviation from the way in which everything was
planned to happen. In order to thrive under this taut environment, the produc-
tion system must have undergone major changes. The procedures that the pur-
chasing department developed to step up to the challenge of building the
B-17E are good examples (Aviation June 1941). This group implemented
methods to keep track ofthe status ofall outside production parts, check ven-
dors' work on site, and give suggestions to subcontractors. To administer these
procedures, the staff expanded from six people at the beginning ofthe B-17E
to apeakof130. Similarly, productionplanning and control expandedfrom 200
people as ofJanuary 1939 to apeakof2,960 in January 1945 (although the sec-
ondfigure contains the personnel for the B-29 and thus overstates the needs of
the B-17 program). It is these core managers of the control departments at
Plant No.2 who learned what it took to increase the velocity ofproduction.
4.4.6 Summary
The learning effect manifested itselfin terms ofdeclining direct laborhours.
Either there was less work to do per airframe, or it must have taken less time
to do a given amount ofwork. For the former to be true, there must have been
product design changes that lent themselves to better manufacturability. In the
B-17 program, design changes were initiated predominantly for higherproduct
performance rather than improved manufacturability. Therefore, it must be the
case that it somehow took less time to do a given amount of work. There are
three possibilities corresponding to the different ways in which direct labor
hours are typically spent-productive work time, nonproductive work time,
and idle time. First, direct workers may have learned to do their real job faster
and faster in the spirit of learning by doing or, alternatively, with the aid of
capital investment. Second, direct workers may have spent less and less time
performing nonproductive work such as material handling and inspection, and
more and more time performing productive work. Third, direct workers may
have spent less and less time waiting for parts, work pieces, and production
instructions. The recent advance in operations management reveals how little
ofdirect labor time went to productive work and how much went to the other
two categories.28 A close examination of the history of the B-17 program, a
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locus classicus of the leaming-by-doing literature, strongly suggests that the
measured learning effect stems primarily from the second and third possibili-
ties. It is the system ofproduction that embodies learning, not the direct work-
ers themselves.
4.5 Ford Willow Run versus Boeing Seattle
It should be noted that the conclusion reached in the previous section is not
unrelated to how Boeing chose to implement high-volume production. Spe-
cifically, Boeing stayed away from mass production pioneered by the Ford Mo-
tor Company. The peculiar features ofBoeing's approach become crystal clear
when Plant No.2 is compared with a plant Ford operated in Willow Run,
Michigan, in order to build the Consolidated B-24 heavy bomber and teach
aircraft manufacturers the mass-production methods, equipment, and philoso-
phies ofthe automobile industry.29
Boeing organized for flexibility. The Ford Willow Run plant showcased the
hardware-centered approach to high-volume production. The plant covered 67
acres under one roof, and provided two 150-foot-wide areas more than 2,000
feet long. Ford broke down the B-24, which was similar to the B-17 in size,
into approximately seventy subassemblies (40 percent more than Boeing did
with the B-17), and laid down an assembly line to put them together progres-
sively. The Willow Run plant also differed from Plant No.2 in the use ofper-
manent steel dies, elaborate fixtures, complex machine tools, and moving chain
conveyors. Moreover, all of the jigs, fixtures, and main dies installed by Ford
were ofheavy, sturdy, long-lasting construction. In other words, Ford tried to
achieve high volumes ofoutput by the design ofthe process-a hallmark ap-
proach ofmass production. It takes a lot oftime and effort to complete tooling
up front, but, once it is done, it does not take much thought to produce in high
volumes, for the tooling itself embodies a pool of knowledge about how to
execute production.
In contrast, Plant No.2 chose the software-centered approach to high-
volume production. Had all the work in progress been removed from the plant,
it would have been an enormous empty box devoid oftangible structures sug-
gesting how airplanes were built there. By the same token, Plant No.2 was
scalable in that it could adjust to a wide range of production rates without
drastic changes in the operating efficiency. Willow Run, with its fixed produc-
tion process, needed a certain number of people to run regardless of the pro-
duction rate because the division oflabor there created a predetermined num-
ber ofpositions to be staffed at all times.
Willow Run was highly efficient once it was up and running. However, it
refused to run for an unexpectedly long time until minute technical details
29. Air Materiel Command (1946b), vii. The Willow Run plant was owned by the government,
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were all sorted out. In fact, the war was over before the plant reached peak
capacity. The efficiency ofWillow Run was due mainly to scale economies-
process design geared rigidly to a large scale ofoutput from the outset. In this
respect, it is analogous to Adam Smith's pin manufacturer that set up a process
employing ten persons. What appears a learning process here is merely a pe-
riod of adjustment-much like friction in physics-that is necessary before
the process design reaches its potentia1. As soon as the potential is reached,
however, there will be no further progress. Whether a plant is blessed with
scale economies or learning economies is largely a question of the process
design it chooses to implement at the outset (Zeitlin 1995).
4.6 Indices ofExperience
If learning is embodied in the production system, how should the classical
learning curve be modified? To answer this question, we must return to the
regression. In the context oflearning on the shop floor, it has been customary
to consider experience somewhat narrowly as representing the history ofpro-
duction activities. To formalize this idea, let Xt stand for the output in month t.
Alternative measures ofexperience as ofmonth T are then expressed by differ-
ent ways to sum up the raw data, (Xl' X2, • •• , Xr). Three summary indices
immediately suggest themselves: the elapsed time T, the cumulative output
Yr == L;=l Xt' and the maximal proven capacity to date Zr == maxI:5t:~:;rXt'
T represents "learning by thinking." Although it is often argued that elapsed
time would matter because of the external progress of technology (Fellner
1969), the duration and the surroundings of the B-17 program largely invali-
date this interpretation. This variable must therefore stand for the viewpoint
that the most scarce input to learning is the time to think. The choice of the
time scale was made immaterial in the following analysis by entering this vari-
able in the exponential form of eT.
Yr captures "learning by doing" or activity-based experience. This stock
variable grows only with stimuli from production activities, but in doing so
does not distinguish whether or not activities are simply repetitive. It could
thus be associated with either direct labor skill improvement or accumulation
oftechnical know-how.
Zr in contrast represents "learning by stretching." This boundary variable
grows only when the plant stretches its activity level to a new height. ,It is a
good proxy for the production system in place. The plant needs to revamp its
production systemin orderto stretch. Once the production system is revamped,
however, it will stay puteven when the output level.goes back down. Unlike the
cumulative output measuring total experience, Zr stands for new experience,
discriminating whether current production activities push the frontier ofexpe-
rience forward and disregarding any redundant experience.
The bulkoftable 4.1 is designed to evaluate these alternative expressions of
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where kT is a capital-labor ratio, ET an index of experience, ea constant, and
t T a random disturbance term. This formulation is equivalent, up to the distur-
bance, to the standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
(4)
-0: 1+0: -8
x = AK1+13 L1+13 £1+13,
where A is a constant, LT == [TXT is the total direct labor hours, KT == kTLTis
the productive capital stock available in month T, and the last term containing
an experience variable works as a shifter of the production function. The ap-
pendix discusses the capital data in detail.30
Observers ofwartime production often attributed the dramatic reduction of
unit direct labor hours to the adoption of mass-production techniques.31 The
analysis here controls for this consideration with two variables-the rate of
output XT(Viner 1931) and the capital-labor ratio kT-while attributing the
remainder ofthe labor-hours reduction to experiential learning.
Rapping (1965) applied model (4) to the Liberty Ship data during World
War II. He concluded that the learning effect was related to the cumulative
output more than to the elapsed time because the latter's coefficient became
insignificant in the presence of the former variable. Argote, Beckman, and
Epple (1990) used the same data set and the same formulation with another
experience variable ofthe form 2.;=1 'AT-tXt' that is, the cumulative output dis-
counted at a constant rate. They found that this variable, or knowledge after
forgetting, explained the learning effect even better than the simple cumulative
output. Their result on the depreciation rate 'A suggested that only 3.2 percent
ofthe knowledge stock survived one year later and labor turnover had little to
do with this high rate offorgetting. These findings are no doubt interesting but
demand an explanation as to who knows what in the first place and why a
learning agent can forget the content oflearning so fast. Answering these ques-
tions is difficult within the Liberty Ship data because they contain many inde-
pendent shipyards.
The analysis of the B-1? data reported in table 4.1 tells a clear-cut story
about Plant No.2, a plant that had only one product. Columns 2 through 4
present the result of employing eT , YT, and ZT' respectively in place of £T in
equation (3). The coefficients are all statistically significant and the fit is al-
ways excellent. They also exhibit scale economies and the effect of capital-
labor substitution as expected. In spite ofthese desired properties, columns 2
and 3 suffer profoundly from serial correlation ofthe residuals. The character-
30. This study actually derived kT as KT / L r The denominator is not the head count of direct
workers because the Air Materiel Command (1946a) stopped reporting this data as soon as the
B-29 conversion project made it unclear how many workers were engaged in the B-17 program
on a full-time basis.
31. See Middleton (1945) and Simonson (1960) for aircraft production and Searle (1945) for
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istic combination ofa high R2 and a low Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that
these two models capitalize on chance to fit the data. Their residuals indeed
show a clear pattern: a model incorporating either eT or YT systematically un-
derestimates the unit direct labor hours whenever they cease to decline. The
problem is that both eT and YT consistently grow and, therefore, are unable to
explain any reverse movement ofthe dependent variable. The B-17 data aggra-
vate this problem because the unit direct labor hours reversed the downward
trend during the cutback phase ofthe production program.
In contrast, the ZT measure in column 4 escapes the problem ofserial corre-
lation. First, this model has a high enough Durbin-Watson statistic to exceed
the lower bound at the conventional 1 percent confidence level. Test for auto-
correlation thus presents no positive sign of missing variables. Second, even
if serial correlation does exist, its consequence is minimal for the result in
column 4. Column 5 replaces OLS with EGLS (estimated generalized least
squares) adopting the two-step Cochrane-Orcutt method.32 The result of this
procedure is parameter estimates extremely close to those ofcolumn 4.
The reason only ZT escapes serial correlation is more than a statistical acci-
dent. In other data that consist only ofthe expansion phase, it would be tricky
to separate the effect of the scale variable and alternative experience vari-
ables.33 In the B-17 data the presence of the cutback phase breaks this collin-
earity. Figure 4.2 shows that the unit direct labor hours at a given rate ofoutput
differed between before and after the peak ofproduction. It is this gap that an
index ofexperience ought to explain. The extremely low Durbin-Watson statis-
tic ofcolumn 6 in table 4.1 attests to the existence ofa missing variable aside
from kT and XT • Both eT and YT fail to fill the gap because their growth is too
regular. Froma technical viewpoint, ZT mitigates this problembecauseit grows
selectively. It too is irreversible, butit at least stays constant during the cutback
phase. As a result, column 4 leaves only random residuals and no indication of
further missing variables.
The evidence from Boeing's B-17 production program thus offers strong
support to the hypothesis of learning by new experiences.34 The source of
learning then is the new experience that is inherent in the challenges ofscaling
up effective capacity. The alternative hypothesis of learning by doing contra-
dicts the data at least in one respect because they suggest that no learning took
place during the cutback phase of the B-17 program.35 In the last column of
32. The first-step residuals yielded a correlation coefficient ofp = .307.
33. In the B-17 data the correlation coefficient with the rate ofoutput XT for the first thirty-one
months ofexpansion is .608 for e~ .966 for YT' and .996 for Zr
34. This empirical finding substantiates widespread intuition and Arrow (1962), in reviewing
works of psychologists, alluded to new stimuli as the engine of steadily increasing performance;
Dutton and Thomas (1984) similarly referred to the learning opportunities that scale-up brings
about.
35. Ofcourse, it is conceivable that confusion associated with the B-29 conversion washed out
the effectoflearning that did occureven during the cutbackphase. Basedon the available evidence
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table 4.1, ZT indeed nullifies the effect ofcumulative output YT • As in Argote,
Beckman, and Epple (1990) a high depreciation rate would technically relax
the rigidity of the cumulative output, but would soon run into the difficulties
ofexplaining constant rapid forgetting.
4.7 AModel ofScale-up Economies
This section integrates all the findings from Boeing's B-17 production while
attempting generalization beyond a specific historical case. It first converts the
empirical formulation ofthe last section into a schematic model describing the
dynamic behavior ofmanufacturing cost. It then lays out the model's underpin-
nings by linking the agent, content, and source of learning explicitly to the
production system and the operating know-how embodied therein. The section
finally discusses the model's implications briefly.
4.7.1 The Model
The quantitative analysis of the B-17 program gave rise to the following
formulation in section 4.6 (table 4.1, column 5): l == <f>/(aX~Z8. This formulation
conceptually translates into a dynamic cost function ofthe form
(5) C = C(X, Z) for 'iX ~ Z.
The first step is to extend the unit direct labor hours to the total unit cost on
the left-hand side and generalize the functional form to accommodate this ex-
tension. The rationale is that the unit direct labor hours often signal the effi-
ciency of entire operations. Such was clearly the case in Plant No.2, where
the rising velocity of production was the direct cause of the reduction in the
unit direct labor hours.
The second step concerns the right-hand-side variables. Section 4.6 singled
out three determinants ofthe unit direct labor hours: the capital-labor ration k
(factor substitution effect), the rate of output X (scale economies), and the
proven effective capacity Z (learning effect). Of these, the last two variables
explain the bulk of the 89.2 percent labor savings that Plant No.2 achieved
between September 1941 andAugust 1944.36 In contrast, the capital-laborratio
is statistically significant but economically unimportant because it did not
fluctuate much. Capital and labor tended to grow together rather than one sub-
stituting the other. The coefficient of variation is 53.2 for X, 57.6 for Z, and
only 33.7 for k. The last figure even drops to 16.1 without the first four months
of 1941 when workforce expansion was still catching up with plant expansion.
the increase in the unit direct labor hours reflects negative economies of scale due to the cutback
itself.
36. During this period, Z increased more than 17 times, which, given the estimated coefficient,
would trigger 77.5 percent reduction in the unit direct labor hours all by itself. Likewise, X re-
corded a 52-fold increase, which alone would cause 65.0 percent reduction. These two effects























Fig.4.10 Dynamic cost function
The factor substitution effect is therefore omitted from the dynamic cost
function.
The cost function (5) is dynamic partly because it departs from the aggrega-
tion approach ofthe past. The classical learning curve aggregates all the deter-
minants of the unit cost in one variable: the cumulative output Y. It was an
antithesis to the traditional scale economies where the rate ofoutputXassumed
the role of a sole explanatory variable. The dynamic cost function, however,
acknowledges the presence of both reversible and irreversible effects on the
unit cost. The two variables, X and Z, that it incorporates are measurable in an
identical quantitative unit and capture the dynamic behavior ofmanufacturing
cost in a simple diagram.
Figure 4.10 shows the workings of the dynamic cost function. First, let's
assume that the plant has experienced the output rate of up to Z = X2• The
curve C(X, X2) depicts the reversible effect, describing the unit cost as a func-
tion ofthe rate ofoutput X. As the plant moves back from X2 to Xl' so does its
cost position from A2 to AI. By the same token, the cost declines from Al to A2
as the plant increases output from Xl to X2 due to conventional scale econo-
mies. The location of Xl is arbitrary so long as it lies to the left of X2• The
extension ofthe curve C(X, X2) to the right ofX2 is illusory since the plant has(6)
(7)
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never operated in this domain. The figure empirically postulates that the curve
(5) is downward sloping, that is,
a: C(x, z) = Cx ::; 0 for 'dX ::; Z,
based on the finding that the coefficient ofX, or f3 in model (3), is unambigu-
ously negative.
Now, what happens when this plant scales up from X2 to X3?According to
the dynamic cost function, the plant's cost position will shift from A2 to B3, of
which the vertical gap between A2 and A3 is due to the reversible effect and
that between A3 and B3 due to the irreversible shift ofthe curve C(X, X2) down
to C(X, X3). The curve connecting BI and B3 corresponds to the new reality that
the plant has pushed its frontier from the vertical line A2 - B2 to A3 - B3 and
irreversibly experienced the rate ofoutput as high as X3• Once this shift occurs,
the cost position reverts to BI' as opposed to AI' even when the production is
scaled back to XI. The dynamic cost function thus postulates that
~C(X, Z) = C z ::; 0 for 'dX ::; z. aZ
The basis for (7) is again the empirical result demonstrating that the coefficient
ofZ, or 8 in model (3), is unambiguously negative. It is this downward shift of




There is no denying that the model ofscale-up economies stands on only one
study ofone plant. More studies are undoubtedly needed to claim the model's
applicability elsewhere. It is nonetheless useful to explore the implications of
the new model since its merit also depends on the credibility of the story it
tells.
One immediate payoffofthe new model is its ability to resolve a controversy
over the learning curve: whether the learning curve would remain in effect
forever or the unit cost would cease to decline at some point. Explanations
abound for individual cases where the unit cost did level off (Asher 1956;
Baloff 1966; Conway and Schultz 1959). However, there have been no theoret-
ical predictions as to where and when a plateau might appear. With the pro-
posed model, plateauing is a natural consequence for the plants that stop scal-
ing up. If they further cut back production and start operating under longer
37. The dynamic cost function suggests a new distinction between short run and long run. In
the neoclassical theory ofproduction, this distinction hinges upon whether or not a time period is
long enough to permit changes in the plant scale while holding the stock oftechnical knowledge
constant. Instead, it may be more fruitful to consider long run as a time period long enough to
permit changes in the effective capacity Z.174 Kazuhiro Mishina
system cycle times, the model would predict "toe-up" (Reguero 1957) in which
the unit cost begins to climb as it did in Boeing's B-17 data.
The proposed model also offers implications for plant management. Ifexpe-
rience is measured by the cumulative output as in the classical learning curve,
every bit of production counts equally toward cost reduction and, therefore,
there is not much the plant can do except to keep producing. With the new
model, there is no learning where there is no challenge. Simply repeating the
same production activities would not contribute to cost reduction autono-
mously because production counts only at the margin ofexperience. In order
to learn, the plant must overextend itself beyond current effective capacity.
Even though effective capacity may not be a control variable in the short run,
scale-up with minimal investment might focus a plant on a set ofactivities that
propels all functional units toward higher efficiency. It remains to be seen how
important the kind of resource constraints that existed in Plant No.2, espe-
cially limited plant space, really is for the learning effect to occurand continue.
The new model raises a subtle question ofoptimal scaling-up strategy. IfCzz
;;:::: 0 holds as a finer property of the dynamic cost function, it would favor
incremental scale-up whereby efforts are devoted to cycle-time reduction
whenever possible and however small each gain may be. Otherwise, surpassing
a threshold scale becomes a foremost priority. Inference of this property is
not straightforward since most functional forms, including the Cobb-Douglas,
impose convexity. One way to bring the B-17 data to bear on the question of
optimal scale-up strategy is to expand the term log Z to the second order where
the coefficient of Z2 must be negative if Czz is ever to fall below zero. The
result shows a small positive coefficient that is not statistically different from
zero. Combined with the lack of clear patterns in the residuals of the Cobb-
Douglas model, the B-17 data seem to support global superiority ofthe incre-
mental scale-up strategy.
The model also poses a crucial question about the management of know-
how. The best scenario calls for growth that would keep X at rising Z and
thereby reap economies of scale and scale-up simultaneously. If the unit of
analysis for which this model holds true remains at the plantlevel, such growth
should not scatter over many different plants. Other things being equal, a firm
should rather develop a centralized manufacturing complex that would retain
all the know-how. A different conclusion will result if it is possible to share
know-how effectively within a network of plants. Unfortunately, the present
study ofone plant is not designed to address this question concerning the orga-
nizational boundary ofknow-how. It only suggests the variables to measure in
future research.
Another strategic implication revolves around the role of incumbency. If
cumulative output is the adequate measure of experience, the learning effect
should give rise to strong first-mover's advantage in terms of manufacturing
cost (Spence 1981). The upshot is a high entry barrier and concentrated indus-
try structure, which are strangely missing from certain industries that are be-175 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
lieved to exhibit the learning effect. In the proposed model, it is not the incum-
bency per se that matters. In this regard, the model agrees with the findings of
Argote, Beckman, and Epple (1990) in spite of the differences in its specifi-
cation.
4.8 Conclusion
This essay examines a historical case that resembles a controlled laboratory
experiment. Under special circumstances of wartime production, one plant
manufactured one product for one customer who kept detailed records ofpro-
duction activities to make sure that weapon manufacturers did not profit from
the war. The case further contained a cutback phase where scale shrank clearly
but experience did not. This feature allowed the essay to isolate these two criti-
cal variables that are highly collinear in most data. From a methodological
standpoint, the essay departs from previous studies that used minute differ-
ences in the goodness offit to guide the process ofmodel selection. It instead
relies on serial correlation as well as nonquantitative case information. The
result is a clear rejection ofthe learning-by-doing hypothesis that holds direct
workers or engineers as the learning agent. The following points summarize
the emerging, alternative conception oflearning:
1. The source of learning is new experiences that scaling-up of effective
capacity entails. In Boeing's Plant No.2, learning did not seem to occur when
production was cut back even though production itself continued at a smaller
scale. In other words, "quality" ofexperience mattered. Doing alone, without
any regard to the redundancy ofexperience, did not give rise to learning.
2. Scale-up triggers system changes. Changes that took place in Plant No.2
were subtle, and concentrated in the area of management of operations: how
to manage a smooth flow of work in progress from vendors to the plant and
inside the plant itself despite space constraints and despite a host ofproblems
that could occur unpredictably. Thus, the content of learning is operating
know-how, which makes up the production system.
3. The agent of learning is the core managers of control functions in the
plant, that is, those who coordinate various aspects ofthe plant operations to
ensure that work in progress flows smoothly without interrupting events so the
shop manager can concentrate on his or her job ofmeeting production sched-
ules while supervising the direct workers. In Plant No.2, departments such as
production control grew most rapidly as the plant exhibited learning effects.
4. During the four years Boeing produced the B-17s in high volumes, the
unit direct labor hours declined from roughly seventy-one worker-years to
eight worker-years. The magnitude involved here is clearly too large to be ex-
plained by skill improvement. In Plant No.2the bulkoflabor savings appeared
to originate from the hours in which direct skill was not being applied in the
first place. The key was instead throughput-time reduction and the operating
know-how that enabled it.176 Kazuhiro Mishina
5. The hardware of production has little to do with learning in airframe
fabrication and assembly. In Plant No.2 the learning effect took place long
after capital investment was suspended. The same goes for product and process
engineering. These elements may be necessary for production, but not suffi-
cient for the observed cost dynamics. Factor substitution effect was economi-
cally unimportant, although scale economies prevailed along with scale-up
economies.
Appendix
This study constructed the capital data through three steps: (1) determining the
base capital that existed in Plant No. 2 prior to the expansion projects under-
taken for the B-17 program, (2) adding to the base the capital expended for the
expansion projects on a monthly basis, and (3) adjusting the resulting monthly
data for subcontracting as well as the conversion to the B-29. What follows
explains each step in some detail.
Base
The base line represents the capital that had accumulated in Plant No.2
since land was acquired for this new site in 1935, until the beginning of 1940.
It excludes Plant No. 1 and a subsidiary facility in Wichita, Kansas. The base
was estimated at $1,156,159 from Boeing's annual reports through the follow-
ing calculation:
$3,230,070 Property and equipment at cost as of31 December 1939
for BoeingAirplane Company
(1,890,207) Property and equipment at cost as of31 December 1934
for Boeing Airplane Company
(371,304) Property and equipment at cost as of31 December 1939
for StearmanAircraft Division




Four expansion projects involved the main building of Plant No. 2 and in-
creased its productive capacity. The total amount of investment was allocated
equally from the month in which occupancy started to the month in which
the project was completed. The construction period, typically six months, was
ignored because capacity was unavailable for production. Table 4A.1, lists the
projects. The Air Materiel Command (1946a) contains more detailed infor-
mation.177 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve

























681 October 1943 38,700
682 November 1943 47,100
683 November 1943 49,630
684 November 1943 37,086
685 December 1943 33,050
686 December 1943 51,000
687 October 1944 33,300
Boeing also added seven feeder plants in 1943 and 1944 as in table 4A.2.
These facilities were added to the monthly capital data at $3.50 per square
foot, which was typical for Boeing's own investment, in the month when they
recorded the first line-off.
Adjustment
To make the capital data comparable to the direct labor hours data, the re-
sulting monthly capital data were divided by one minus the subcontracting
ratio to adjust for subcontracting. The subcontracting ratio was 28 percent in
1941 and 1942, 29 percent in 1943, and 32.6 percent in 1944. The data were
then scaled down to reflect the conversion to the B-29. The delivery ofthe B-
29 from Renton began in January 1944 and continued throughout the year at a
monthly rate between two airplanes and thirty-five airplanes. Hershey (1944)
describes the manner in which Plant No.2 was converted for this purpose from
April 1944 to March 1945. Based on this information, the capital data were
linearly reduced beginning with April 1944 so that they reach zero in May
1945 when Plant No.2 was no longer engaged in the B-1? program.
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Comment Ross Thomson
Ongoing productivity growth is not only a critical feature ofcapitalist develop-
ment, it also forms a vexing problem for economic analysis, which often con-
Ross Thomson is associate dean ofthe College ofArts and Sciences and associate professor of
economics at the University ofVermont.180 Kazuhiro Mishina
ceives technical change as something that happens to finns, not by them. In-
sightfully taking up this problem, Kazuhiro Mishina forwards both a striking
example of productivity growth and a plausible explanation of how learning
within the firm led to this growth.
Mishina examines the Boeing plant that manufactured the B-17 bomber,
the so-called Flying Fortress, during World War II. Productivity growth was
remarkable; labor time per airframe in 1944 had fallen to about one-tenth of
that three years earlier. Equally remarkably, after the plant had been tooled up,
this output growth occurred withoutincreases in the capital stock, so at its peak
the plant produced over four times as many airframes as its rated capacity! The
principal argument ofthe paper is that labor productivity growth resulted from
whatMishina calls "learning by stretching," which is learning that occurs when
the finn has to scale up production in a given plant. This argument can be
read in two steps. First, intrafinn learning, and not other factors, accounted for
productivity growth, and second, this learning can bestbe interpreted as learn-
ing by stretching. I will comment on each ofthese steps and then on the gener-
ality ofthe case.
Boeing's productivity growth is especially intriguing because many of the
factors used to explain productivity gains did not apply. Growing labor produc-
tivity could not be explained by changes in the quantity or quality of inputs.
The plant and its equipment were complete early in the period analyzed and
changed little afterward. Workforce skill declined as skilled craftsmen were
replaced by workers new to airframe production, by 1944 overwhelmingly
women. Nor can growing labor productivity be cast into doubtby product sim-
plification, quality reduction, or the expansion ofoutsourcing. The product if
anything became more complex, and subcontracting increased very little over
time. Learning from other firms was unimportant; Boeing was the leader, and
others learned from it. Economies ofscale cannot explain much ofthe produc-
tivity growth, because plant capacity did not change after May 1942. Having
ruledoutchanging inputs, external knowledge, productdeterioration, and scale
economies, Mishina concludes that productivity grew through a learning pro-
cess occurring within the plant.
This is a strong argument, but it makes more sense after the plant had com-
pletely introduced mass production than before. As Mishina notes, before mid-
1942, the plant was expanding, mass production was inaugurated, and special-
purpose equipment was justcoming on line. These innovations were associated
with embodied technical change and the learning that comes from mastering
that technology. It also seems likely that Boeing, untrained in mass production,
learned from other firms, which trained workers and managers adept at inter-
changeable parts manufacturing, sold Boeing machine tools, and perhaps con-
tracted to mass-produce parts. It is true that important elements ofthe transi-
tion to mass production were complete before the first planes were delivered,
but there can be no doubt that much of the early productivity growth, which
averaged an amazing 14 percent permonth through mid-1942, was due to new181 Revisiting the Flying Fortress Learning Curve
mass-production equipment and procedures and probably also to economies of
scale as rated capacity was approached. For Boeing, like Ford in the begin-
nings ofmass production, superior equipment, learning from other firms, and
scale economies all had parts in improving labor productivity. That said,
Mishina is likely right that after mid-1942, the still-remarkable 4 percent
monthly growth in labor productivity had another explanation.
What is that explanation? Mishina advances narrative and econometric argu-
ments that Boeing "stretched" its capacity and so increased output relative to
capital and labor. It multiplied output with a given capital stock (hence increas-
ing the productivity of capital) by reducing the plant's throughput time (the
time interval from the first through the last stage ofproduction) by two-thirds.
It increased labor productivity by decreasing the time ofparts manufacture and
more importantly by reducing the time when workers were either waiting for
parts or reworking parts not conforming to the required extreme tolerances.
Increases in the productivity ofcapital and labor had similar causes. Growing
interchangeability decreased the time of assembly and increased the velocity
ofthroughput (or labor time and production time in Marx's terminology). This
growth had its source in both hardware-new machine tools, dies, jigs, and
templates-and "software" changes in work standards and procedures and in
tool monitoring. A just-in-time production system also reduced idle labor time
and throughput time by improving materials flow and inventory control and
by coordinating and dividing subassemblies. To implement and monitor these
changes required greater managerial coordination, so that increasing efficien-
cies in the utilization ofcapital and direct labor came by means of increasing
managerial labor, perhaps growing even in relation to output.
This is a fascinating story about which we'd like to know more. Exactly
how were these results obtained? Every capitalist would like to increase the
productivity oflabor and capital simultaneously, but they evidently do not al-
ways do so. How did Boeing do it, and do it at such an extraordinary rate?
Mishina demonstrates that there was a challenge and a successful response,
but not how that success was achieved. In particular, because managers were
the key locus of learning, we need to know more about how they were orga-
nized, how they learned, and how they used this learning to restructure input
coordination, work rules, worker training, and production flows. Furthermore,
Mishina's core claim-thatit "is the system ofproduction that embodies learn-
ing, not the direct workers themselves"-merits further exploration. Many
learning theories agree that the learning process is interactive and systemic,
such as short-run learning with existing equipment (David 1975; Lazonick and
Brush 1985), long-run learning by doing through purchased capital goods (Da-
vid 1975), learning by using capital equipment (such as Rosenberg [1982] il-
lustrated for commercial aircraft), and learning by selling that transmits prod-
uct knowledge (Thomson 1989). But such interactive learning can apply just
as much to the individual operation as to the relation among operations. We
might test the claim that the systemic coordination was more important than182 Kazuhiro Mishina
improvements in individual operations by inquiring whether machinists mak-
ing parts increased relative to workers assembling parts. This was likely so,
just as it was so in the prolonged period it took firearms and sewing machines
to attain interchangeability in the nineteenth century (Hounshell 1984). But
then what distinguishes Boeing's systemic learning from that of Singer or
Ford?
The econometric analysis counterposes traditional learning approaches,
which focus on labor productivity as function of cumulative output or time
since invention, to learning by stretching, which focuses on the novelty ofover-
coming capacity constraints. Econometrically, Mishina favors the last, because
while all approaches are statistically significant, learning by stretching over-
comes problems ofcollinearity in the other two. This formulation expects pro-
ductivity to grow only when output reaches a new maximum, and so-unlike
the other two-does not expect productivity growth when output ceases to
grow. Mishina's argument is interesting and sensible; learning responding to
the challenge of increasing output in a given plant is likely to augment labor
productivity. But the argument raises three issues. First, such learning is not
universal; there are incentives and opportunities to learn even with constant
output and unchanging plant. Second, the argument raises questions ofcausal-
ity. In learning by stretching, managers learn in an effort to increase both out-
putand labor productivity. When successful, learning today results in expanded
output and growing labor productivity in current or later periods. The correla-
tion ofthe two is then the outcome of a third factor, prior learning. If so, why
is one the independent and the other the dependent variable? In an important
sense, they can be mutually reinforcing. Productivity increases can speed
throughput. Output increases might generate new bottlenecks, which in tum
lead to learning that increases later output levels or reduces labor costs at ex-
isting output levels. This may account for Boeing's continued productivity
growth after the maximum capacity had been reached. In this case, learning
forms a cumulative process in which productivity growth, output growth, and
learning each feeds into the others. Third, when and with what limits does such
learning occur? One important factor omitted in the econometrics is manage-
ment. Ifmanagers were the key learners, would expanding numbers ofmanag-
ers be associated with learning and later productivity increases? Moreover, it
seems implausible that Boeing could indefinitely increase output within the
same plant. Is there then a "long-run" learning by stretching associated with
investment to expand the plant or to build others?
The final issue to address is whether this case has general implications. Its
7 percent monthly productivity growth rate was far higher than the 2 percent
annual growth more typical ofshort-run learning (e.g., David 1975). Was this
exceptionally rapid productivity growth rate so unique that the B-17 had
no wider lessons? The challenge to increase output with a given plant may
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lead to labor-saving and capital-saving learning. But it rarely has capacity-
exceeding and labor-productivity effects as large as those at Boeing.
I conjecture that Boeing's extraordinary productivity growth resulted from
the confluence oftwo trends, each ofwhich also applies to otherfirms: wartime
expansion and radical innovation over the product cycle. The very context in
which Boeing's uniqueness appears-thefrantic production for a world war-
allows us to draw some more general lessons. The rapid, multidimensional
growth in B-17 production was mirrored by that in the economy as a whole in
the 1938-50 period, when output, labor productivity, and capital productivity
annually grew at the then-unprecedented rates of over 5, 3, and 3 percent re-
spectively (Maddison 1991). The peak of this growth was reached in exactly
the years of Boeing's B-17 expansion. In some estimates, from 1941 through
1944 aggregate output grew at 15 percent per year, and the 7 percent growth
ofaggregate labor productivity was exceeded by the expansion ofcapital pro-
ductivity (Maddison 1991; Dumenil, Glick, and Levy 1992).
Wartime expansion was constrained not by demand but by supply factors.
Producers could sell all they could make. Yet their expansion was constrained
by the scarcity of labor, a problem against which Boeing fought constantly.
Producers were also constrained by the uncertainty of whether major private
capital investments would be warranted after the war, and perhaps additionally
by the scarcity ofinvestmentfunds. For one orboth reasons, private investment
was modest; the government was key to Boeing's investments. In this demand-
abundant, supply-constrained context, firms had incentives to use capacity
more fully. In more typical times, excess capacity exists, creating less pressure
to produce beyond capacity, especially when this would lead to rising wage
costs. At the same time, retained earnings allow investment to occur in antici-
pation offuture demand.
Boeing's experience reflected this wartime productivity boom, but took it to
a higher level. In this Boeing shared features with other firms developing new
products. Even if demand-constrained growth is normal in capitalist develop-
ment, firms in the market-expansion phase ofproductcycles face strong excess
demand. Here particularly rapid output growth and labor-productivity growth
often occur together, likely accompanied by short-run learning by doing. In
periods ofrapid product cycle expansion-which distinguished Boeing from
most of the wartime economy-labor productivity rises through learning by
stretching and doing in the short-run but also through learning by selling that
improves products and increases scale, learning by using, and learning by pur-
chasing new capital goods. Productivity growth is especially rapid when the
new commodity comes to be produced in a radically different kind ofproduc-
tion process, such as in sewing machines in the 1860s and 1870s, automobiles
in the 1910s, and airframes in the 1940s.
In my conjecture, Boeing's uniqueness combines the penetration phase of
product cycles with the transition to a particular kind of mass production in184 Kazuhiro Mishina
the context of a supply-constrained, wartime economy. Other war industries
expanded output and exceeded capacity, but often without the same labor-
productivity increases. Firms introducing assembly-line techniques to produce
new commodities dramatically increased labor productivity but not capital
productivity. Ford introduced such assembly-line procedures to make B-29s in
World War II. Boeing did not; its investments were more flexible, embodied
more in management than in hardware. Its output accelerated more quickly as
a result. Boeing thus benefited from three circumstances each of which has
broader application: wartime, supply-constrained economies; new products
facing rapidly growing markets and mass-production requirements; and orga-
nizational innovations that reduced fixed capital expenditures and, as Boeing
anticipated, eased movement into othernew products. These circumstances can
occur separately; Boeing grew by combining all three.
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